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Empathy, Violence, and Guilt in a Girl-Chimp Experiment: 
An Analysis of Human-Animal Relations in Karen Joy Fowler’s 
Novel We Are Completely Beside Ourselves (2013)
The relations between human and nonhuman animals have long been 
dominantly conceptualized in dichotomous terms. The current discussion 
of animal rights and the criticism of the ascription of epistemological and 
ontological privilege to human animals, known as speciesism, are essential 
themes of critical and cultural animal studies. According to the dichotomous 
view of human-animal relations, a categorical border separates humans, who 
are seen as moral subjects with personal rights, and whose internal life is psy-
chologically accessible, and animals, some of whom can be companions, but 
who always have a lower (or no) legal and cultural status, and whose minds 
remain inaccessible. However, literary texts have been challenging such a 
strict animal/human divide, and respectively, a nature/culture dichotomy for 
a long time. A particularly powerful example is Franz Kafka’s narrative A 
Report to an Academy (1917), in which the liminal figure Rotpeter narrates the 
rapid “evolution” from ape to human as a process of perpetual violence that 
mutilates body, mind, and soul: For Rotpeter “the arrival in human culture 
is only possible through the separation from nature” (Neumeyer 391) and 
implies “an act of violence” (393). With the ape’s painful search for a means 
to escape from confinement, Kafka’s text subverts the categorical boundaries 
between animals and humans, and questions cultural und institutional struc-
tures in which the distinction is embedded. Of course, the text can be read 
both ways: Humans are also natural, and animals are also cultural beings. 
Remarkably, the relationship between humans and primates has been the 
topic of three recent and widely celebrated novels: Karen Joy Fowler’s We 
Are All Completely Beside Ourselves from 2013, shortlisted for the Man Booker 
Prize in 2014, Ulrike Draesner’s Sieben Sprünge vom Rand der Welt [Seven Leaps 
From the Edge of the World], nominated for the German Book Award in 2014, 
and Bettina Suleiman’s début novel Auswilderung [Return to the Wild], also 
published in 2014. Draesner’s entertaining fictional novel puts the non-
aggressive but notoriously sex-seeking bonobos center stage, and deploys 
the perspectives of a retiring primatologist and his three-generational fam-
ily. Suleiman’s novel follows the complex and often unforeseen difficulties 
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of an attempted reintroduction of domesticated gorillas into the wild. In 
contrast, Fowler’s novel—the most subtle, enthralling, and compelling of the 
three books—explores the liminal space of nature/culture as a recovery from 
trauma, told as a quasi-autobiographical narration focusing on Rosemary’s 
time at UC Davis where she studied Literature as a twenty-two-year-old. 
Rosemary works through the suppressed loss of her chimp “twin-sister” 
seventeen years earlier. The first-person narrator addresses a peer—maybe 
the reader, maybe a fictional other—in a colloquial and intimate tone. The 
text combines a close description of feelings, compassion, and grief with 
elaborate reflections on animal experiments, animal welfare, and animal 
rights. Portraying a high level of moral reflection on inter-species relation-
ships, the narrator investigates and articulates in depth her own part in the 
violence against animals, who are not even protected when perceived as a 
beloved “sister” chimpanzee. 
As Gisli Palsson stated in 2014: “Chimpanzees seem to occupy a spe-
cial position in recent writing on the nature/culture divide, as a liminal 
species at the main border of modernist discourse” (166). Fowler’s We Are 
All Completely Beside Ourselves negotiates the permeable boundary between 
human beings and animals with regard to their closest biological relatives, 
i.e., primates, and particularly chimpanzees. The novel is also inspired by 
the famous real-life experiment of the Kellogg family, who in 1931 tried to 
raise a baby-chimp like a human, along with their own child. This experi-
ment was soon terminated when the Kelloggs observed that their infant son 
began adopting chimp behavior.1 In contrast, the fictional experiment in 
Fowler’s book lasts five years and the final separation from the chimp has 
a lasting destructive impact on the whole family: The father, whose scien-
tific reputation is destroyed, becomes a problem drinker; the brother turns 
into an underground animal activist and joins the Animal Liberation Front 
(ALF) after he finds out that his chimp sister has been deported to an animal 
laboratory; the mother becomes depressed; and the daughter cuts herself 
off from the memory of the episode that led to her “twin” sister’s loss. The 
book explores numerous subtle similarities and differences between humans 
and chimps and thereby challenges the hierarchal and dichotomic model of 
human-animal relationships. 
The paper will proceed in three steps. First, I will address four current 
concepts that explore the relationship between humans and apes. I will then 
1 Cf. the interview with Karen Joy Fowler: karenjoyfowler.com/we-are-completely-beside-
ourselves-qa/. Web. 20 Aug. 2016.
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explain Kellogg’s experiment as an eminent background to Fowler’s novel. 
Finally, I will analyze the main plot of the novel, which unfolds when the 
main protagonist realizes her own role in the disappearance of her chimp 
sister Fern, and I will discuss the novel’s contribution to current critical 
debates about human-animal relationships and animal rights. Focusing on 
the complex human-animal entanglements, the article examines an eco-
zoopoetics which features the transition of interspecies companionship and 
togetherness to human superiority and instrumental asymmetry and thus 
narrates an environment that brings about (non-)human trauma and loss.
Humans and Animals: Reflections on an Ambivalent Relationship
In a compact article on humans and apes, the German Studies scholar 
Gerhard Neumann discusses the boundary between nature and culture. 
Conceptualizing nature as a performative process of semantic production, 
Neumann (94-99) distinguishes three positions: The first position is com-
prised of behavioral research on the development stages of primates. An 
example is Frans de Waal’s book The Ape and the Sushi Master (2001), which 
analyzes primates as evolutionary descendants of humans and demonstrates 
that humans are not the only species with a culture (Laland/Galef). The 
second position is articulated by Giorgio Agamben in his book The Open: 
Man and Animal (2003), where he develops a theory of the “anthropological 
machine,” a perpetual set of discourses, practices, and techniques employed 
to (re-)produce the construction of humans in contrast to animals dealing 
with inclusions and exclusions of what is considered human and nonhu-
man. The third position has been proposed by Benjamin Bühler and Stefan 
Rieger in their book Vom Übertier. Ein Bestiarium des Wissens (2006)—roughly 
translated as On the Über-Animal. A Bestiary of Knowledge. This study consid-
ers animals as figurations of knowledge [Wissensfiguren]; the “Über-Animal” 
serves as a condition to enable speaking about nature and culture, about 
humans and machines, and as a paradigm of human incompleteness. While 
the primatologist de Waal aims to minimize the difference between humans 
and apes in emphasizing their common origin, Agamben stresses the power 
relations between humans and animals as a narrative of cultural force, and 
considers the descent of humans from animal ancestors as a strategy of bio-
politics. For Agamben, the distinction from “the” animal constitutes what 
a human being is and does (Borgards 239). By contrast, Bühler and Rieger 
emphasize the deficits of humans in comparison to animals; it is a reversed 
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view on the same relationship pointing at the use of the animal as a medium 
of knowledge. Neumann regards the long history of attempts at drawing a 
boundary between nature and culture as the history of an “identity shock” 
in the face of otherness. According to Neumann, the fundamental experi-
ence of otherness is the paradigm for human self-conception in modernity 
(101). From this perspective, looking at animals appears to be an experience 
of otherness that mediates human self-construction and self-understanding.
While de Wal stresses the similarities between humans and apes—e.g., 
in contrast to primatologist Michael Tomasello who emphasizes the dif-
ferences (cf. the overview by Laland/Galef on the contentious question of 
similarities and differences between animal and human cultures)—Agamben 
and Bühler/Rieger reconstruct not only how humans have defined (and still 
define) themselves as clearly distinct from animals, but also highlight the 
constitutive function of animals for humans. Neumann’s list of arguments 
has to be complemented by a further important position that has been 
developed by Donna Haraway (cf. also Bekoff) and which turns the atten-
tion to the mutual relation between human and nonhuman animals. In her 
book When Species Meet (2008), Haraway develops the idea of “companion 
species” by emphasizing the practice of “becoming with” as the condition 
of “becoming worldly” and shaping an “alter-globalization,” a peaceful and 
fairer globalization (3). She assumes that all creatures constitute themselves 
through interactions: They form figures through “material-semiotic nodes 
or knots in which diverse bodies and meanings coshape one another” (4); 
their identity is the result of the “dance of world-making encounters” (249). 
Instead of regarding nature as an object of scientific and philosophical ob-
servation, Haraway stresses the interdependency of human culture and na-
ture, or what she calls “natureculture” (2) in her book The Companion Species 
Manifesto (2003). Here, she shares the theoretical outlook of Bruno Latour’s 
science and technology studies. Humans appear as part of a mesh of inter-
actions and intra-actions with other species and agencies. By exploring the 
history of relations between people and dogs, Haraway demonstrates that 
“dogs are fleshly material-semiotic presences in the body of technoscience” 
and “[t]hey are here to live with” (5). She describes her personal involvement 
and the situational mutual transformations integrating her own experiences 
with those of her dog, Ms. Cayenne Pepper. In criticizing Derrida’s reflection 
on his shame in reaction to his cat’s gaze, Haraway turns the attention to 
relationships of response and mutual respect that, for her, are the conditions 
of understanding animal intentions. A zoopoetic perspective allows for an 
analysis of the variegated representations of interspecies relationships and 
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takes into account both (non-)human agency as well as the preconditions of 
(non-)human boundaries and limitations. 
Coming back to Fowler’s novel We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves, it 
appears that the main protagonist Rosemary has been an attentive reader of 
Haraway, using Haraway-congruent vocabulary when describing the intimate 
relation to her chimp-sister Fern. Rosemary regards Fern as a responding 
companion whom she believes to understand. But there is also a harsh split 
that had separated the two. When the twenty-two-year-old Rosemary is con-
fronted with her brother’s accusation that she was guilty of Fern’s separation 
from their family, she begins to recall the experiment and its “premature and 
calamitous end” (99). In the course of the narration, Rosemary concludes that 
her life is divided in two—the time with Fern and without Fern. As the process 
of remembering is not linear, neither is the narration, going back and forth, 
spiraling and zigzagging towards the moment when the “twin sisters” got 
separated. Piece by piece, Rosemary reconstructs the emotional impact on 
the family and the “shadow of grief” (Charles) that the events have left—and 
this includes the grief of caged Fern as the reader realizes at the very end of 
the book when Fern and Rosemary face one another through the separating 
glass of the cage (308). By exploring the apes as a liminal space, the book 
refers to former experiments, particularly that of the Kellogg’s which meant 
to compare the development of humans and chimpanzees, but focuses on the 
emotional impacts on all involved members of the experiment. 
Variations of the Kellogg’s Experiment in Fowler’s Novel
Winthrop and Luella Kellogg, comparative psychologists at Indiana Uni-
versity, cross-fostered their son Donald and the chimpanzee Gua in 1931 in 
order to compare the development of their emotional behavior and language 
acquisition. After nine months the experiment was stopped when they ob-
served that their son had adopted animal behavior. The Kelloggs concluded 
that environmental influences play a “tremendous role … upon captive wild 
animals before they are brought to laboratory” (Kellogg 174), assuming that 
“humanizing the ape,” so the title of a famous article in 1931, would require 
bringing up the “anthropoid with a human baby of about the same age” 
(175). In Fowler’s book, the chimp Fern has been found in the Congolese 
jungle as a neglected baby and is adopted by the Cook family. The experi-
ment is finally stopped after five years when Rosemary complains that she 
is growing increasingly “afraid of” her sister Fern (270). The complaint is 
triggered by a gruesome experience: Rosemary has given Fern a kitten to 
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share her affection and compassion, but the chimpanzee squeezes the small 
animal in her hand to death. Rosemary’s complaint encourages her parents 
to call the experiment off, so as not to risk someone getting hurt by Fern. In 
the subtle architecture of the book, the reader only learns towards the end 
that the Cooks had brought Fern to a medical laboratory where she was 
caged, harassed and raped by older male chimps, delivered three children 
and gradually managed to move up the social ranks in the caged troop. The 
novel “shares kinship with both animal studies and animal rights activism” 
in the US, exploring the degree of similarity between chimps and humans 
(Lopičić and Petković 125). 
In comparison to Fowler’s We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves, Kellogg’s 
The Ape and the Child (1933) “follows the scientific standards” in distributing 
scientific data with the “negative side effect” that “the chimpanzee is objecti-
fied and has no voice” (Stolle 30). The Kelloggs refer to Gua as a “subhuman 
organism” and regard the chimp “as less than a human” although they ad-
dress both their son and the chimp as “subjects” (29), while Fowler’s novel 
sets up narrative situations that create an empathetic closeness between the 
“sisters,” with Rosemary trying “to give Fern a voice” (30). Here, the novel’s 
nonlinear structure is remarkable: Rosemary’s story begins somewhere in 
the middle of her life and unfolds her memory in numerous non-chronolog-
ical episodes, in which she as a first-person narrator looks back on the time 
with her sister Fern. She talks about her family constellation, including her 
father, a psychologist at Bloomington University; her mother, agreeing to 
the real-life experiment when friends were searching for a new home for the 
chimpanzee; and her elder brother Lowell, who, like Rosemary herself, soon 
regards Fern not just as a companion pet but rather as a sister. In this family 
constellation, Fern appears to gain the status of an equal subject or a person. 
Rosemary describes many situations in which she “used to believe [to 
know] what Fern was thinking. No matter how bizarre her behavior” (98). 
She states: Fern “was my twin, my fun-house mirror, my whirlwind other 
half” and adds: “It’s important to note that I was also all those things to 
her” (79). The description of the relationship is grounded in great empathy, 
the idea of mutuality and the belief in true mutual understanding. This 
seems also affirmed by the novel’s title We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves, 
which refers to a scene in the novel where Rosemary, Lowell, and Fern are 
completely immersed in joyful, unrestrained play in the snow. The colloquial 
title expresses a situation of unquestioned similarity, community, and equal-
ity when they share a feeling of exhilarating joy. While the novel draws on 
patterns of a family story, the unusual and uncanny creeps in. 
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Although Rosemary emphasizes the mirroring effect that Fern had on her, 
she observes how important differences between the two gradually unfolded, 
particularly in language development, so that she still speaks of “twins” but 
“disparate potentials” (99). She also describes how she “developed the habit 
of speaking for her” and concludes that Fern “seemed to develop the expecta-
tion that I would,” so that she “was already serving as Fern’s translator” at 
the age of three (100). The urge to talk for two turns Rosemary into a very 
talkative girl, as is repeatedly emphasized. On the one hand, looking back, 
Rosemary acknowledges that she experienced a slight feeling of superiority 
because of her language skills. These would not only compensate for other 
motoric skills in which Fern, as she has to admit in retrospect, was always 
superior (82), but it would also compensate for Rosemary’s feeling of being 
neglected and receiving less attention than Fern, which makes her increas-
ingly jealous of her. On the other hand, Rosemary doubts the relevance of 
human language in general, and herewith fundamentally questions the aim 
of her father, who wanted Fern to communicate with humans (98). Rose-
mary, however, turns the tables, finding the question, “[C]an Rosemary 
learn to speak to chimpanzees?” (100) or, more generally, “Can humans 
learn to speak chimpanzee language?” much more appropriate. In recalling 
the constellation, Rosemary questions the preconditions of the experiment 
in which psychologists wanted to find out whether primates were able to 
learn human language. In contrast, she points to “a secret language of grunts 
and gestures,” an “idioglossia” (100) or a “visceral” understanding (Lopičić 
and Petković 119) which she shares with Fern and which only the graduate 
students working as research assistants have recognized. Indeed, current 
research on primates acknowledges the relevance of gestural and mimic 
movements for emotional communication proved in experiments (Liebal; 
Palsson 177-78). In Rosemary’s story, the validation is the intuition of the 
younger self who “always used to believe [to know] what Fern was thinking” 
(98). The narrator Rosemary suspects that communication is possible by 
mimicry and gesticulation only—a suspicion that she found at least partly 
confirmed by significant examples in her college life later on, like the hand-
sign W for “whatever” or L for “loser” (131). 
A further important layer of Rosemary’s story is her strong imitation of 
chimp habits—typical for human infants raised with chimps—to the degree 
that in kindergarten she was considered a “monkey girl” (84), provoking 
the typical “uncanny-valley response” (102) with the result that she was 
bullied quite harshly. Before school enrollment, her mother had given her 
instructions on how to behave:
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Stand up straight.
Keeping my hands still when I talked.
Not putting my fingers into anyone else’s mouth or hair.
Not biting anyone, ever. No matter how much the situation warranted it….
Not jumping on the tables and desks when I was playing. (102)
So, it is understandable that Rosemary considered it a “triumph” to be 
seen as “normal” (132), even if she still got teased by her fellow students. 
While the Kellogg’s experiment at the college was stopped exactly because 
of this reason (adoption of chimp behavior by the human son), the fictional 
Cooks’ experiment is continued much longer and has a much stronger and 
finally disastrous impact on everyone involved, with feelings of loss, trauma, 
suppression, grief, and guilt. These feelings not only mirror the violence 
that Fern has to experience after being separated from her family and after 
getting imprisoned. They are also the counterpart to the violence that her 
brother Lowell adopts in order to take revenge on his parents who had 
decided to hand Fern over to medical treatment—a treatment he considers 
as animal abuse.
Self-Conception through Otherness, Guilt, and Atonement
When Rosemary’s life is split in two, the longer part of her life is the time 
after Fern’s disappearance; this part also represents the much longer part 
of the narration as such. Here, the non-linear temporal structure of the nar-
ration is important: Although the novel is composed of a regular structure 
of six parts with seven chapters each, the course of recollection appears to 
follow the fragmented and tangled logic of a traumatized person, who hesi-
tates but cannot avoid the re-emergence of a suppressed past boiling up in 
unexpected moments as well as in shredded form. It would be worthwhile to 
analyze the narrative structure from the perspective of trauma research—and 
this analysis should include Fern’s trauma, too. In the remainder of my argu-
ment, I focus on the intricate composition of the plot, which only unfolds 
step by step and herewith painstakingly explores the liminal position of the 
chimpanzee in human self-recognition. In doing so, the text represents the 
complex and also traumatic entanglements of human-nonhuman relations. 
The cornerstones of the plot are two situations in which Rosemary is 
falsely imprisoned, undermining long periods of suppression. This aligns 
the human’s and the animal’s perspective while highlighting asymmetrical 
structures. In the opening scene of the book the reader finds Rosemary in a 
university cafeteria where she observes a young couple quarrelling until the 
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girl, drama student Harlow, starts demolishing the café interior. Rosemary, 
who only contributed to the mess through her reaction, dropping a glass of 
milk, finds herself arrested by campus police. But Harlow does not speak 
up to defend her and the waitress who tries to speak up for Rosemary is 
also getting ignored by the cop. After a night in prison, Rosemary is finally 
released thanks to her father’s intervention. Hence, the narration starts with 
the experience of sudden internment and the need for an interceder to regain 
freedom. This will later be mirrored in Fern’s situation after being unjustly 
deported to the experimental lab to which her brother criminally gains ac-
cess but from which he fails to rescue her. 
The injustice and brutality experienced by Fern weighs heavily on Rose-
mary’s brother Lowell, who joins the radical ALF after finding Fern in the 
lab. In the course of the narration, Lowell is hunted by the F.B.I. suspecting 
him of having been involved in destroying the primatology Thurman lab 
at UC Davis (139-40). A series of further violent actions finally leads to his 
arrest, so that he also experiences incarceration. Now classified as environ-
mental terrorist in post 9/11 America, he faces a long prison sentence. In 
contrast to Fern, however, Lowell knows that he could face imprisonment 
and finally regrets that he has made this decision. 
In the second key situation, Rosemary finds herself in a cold concrete 
room of the local police station, waiting to be interrogated in the case of her 
brother. Ironically, it is this experience of confinement that triggers her lost 
memory and makes her aware of her own role in Fern’s disappearance. She 
feels guilty and finds herself a traitor when she remembers how she reacted 
to Fern’s behavior, denouncing her and saying she is “afraid of her” (270). 
Despite being only five years old, Rosemary is accused by her elder brother 
Lowell of effectively demanding her parents to choose between the two of 
them. Rosemary now realizes that, in spite of feeling like a twin-sister to Fern, 
she had adopted and enacted the common objectification and degradation 
of “the animal.” After her complaint, her parent’s decision is structured by 
the unequal status of Rosemary and Fern, where the latter is considered 
not a legal person but a companion animal, a being with lower status that 
has no voice, no saying in the matter of its deportation. This insight is also 
mirrored by a meaningful situation in which Rosemary, waiting for her inter-
rogation, finds a wood louse in the room that has no chance to escape. In an 
empathetic mood she takes the bug out with her as she is finally allowed to 
leave the room. The rescue of the little bug functions as a symbol of freedom 
which, however, can only be achieved through human intervention. 
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During her long day in the interrogation room, Rosemary decides to 
assume responsibility for her brother (cf. 254) and finally to “take care 
of” her sister Fern (274). It is remarkable that her new role as responsible 
liberator constructs a congruence and similarity between her brother and 
the chimpanzee. Rosemary has come to accept her own fault which led to 
Fern becoming a victim of violence in the medical lab; at the same time, she 
now allies herself with Lowell whose actions have turned him into a victim 
of governmental violence. The novel ends in an atmosphere of atonement 
when Rosemary and her mother move near Fern’s chimpanzee estuary in 
Vermillion, South Dakota. Rosemary accepts a position as a school teacher 
for young children whose gesticulation and mimicry she understands quite 
well and collects money for her brother’s legal fees with TV interviews she 
gives on a children’s book about her own chimp-sister story which is based 
on her mother’s diaries. The articulation of her trauma not only liberates 
her emotionally, it also becomes the means for raising the money required 
to help her brother and her chimp sister. 
When Rosemary concludes at the end that she should not have accused 
Fern of mistreating the kitten, she concedes to the difference between herself 
and Fern: 
I’d never thought that Fern would deliberately hurt me…. But her remorseless-
ness, the way she’d stared impassively at the dead kitten and then opened his 
stomach with her fingers, had shocked me to the core…. 
That there was something inside Fern I didn’t know. 
That I didn’t know her in the way I’d always thought I did. 
That Fern had secrets and not the good kind. 
Instead I’d said I was afraid of her. (270) 
These sentences show a double disappointment: On the one hand, Rosemary 
cannot transfer her love for an object of affection to her chimp sister. While 
this could also happen among two human siblings, the second disappoint-
ment makes the book really compelling. Rosemary’s assumption of empathy 
across species is not met by the animal Other. Importantly, the core scene 
involves a third animal, the kitten. When the chimp dissects the small cat, 
the human girl discovers that her assumption of empathy and understand-
ing was not reliable. She is equally horrified by the brutality of the act and 
the inaccessibility of the animal mind. So, this part of the novel includes not 
only a human-chimp relation but a triangle of interspecies relations (hu-
man, chimpanzee, and cat). Ironically, the brutal turn of the play of three 
sets the energy of Rosemary’s latent jealousy free, which then leads to the 
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collapse of the entire experiment in interspecies cohabitation in the sense of 
Haraway. 
Different from the Kellogg’s case, Fowler’s fictional experiment is stopped 
not because the human is animalized through imitation but rather because 
the interspecies relation hits the boundaries of what humans can compre-
hend when it comes to non-human agency. Rosemary has to admit that the 
thought process of the animal Other was not fully accessible to her. Although 
there are different studies on the empathy of apes with kittens, for example, 
Harry Harlow’s experiment with gorilla Koko, who took care of a kitten 
(cf. Moore and Hannon), in Fowler’s book the interaction in the interspe-
cies triangle has a different outcome. It is not without irony that the name 
of Rosemary’s closest, albeit rather ambivalent, college friend—and later 
ALF-combatant of her brother—is also Harlow. In this intra-species triad, 
Rosemary again appears as the jealous person who tends to defend social 
norms against the others. 
Recalling again her betrayal of Fern in the last part of the story, Rosemary 
reflects on this very moment by concluding: “still I knew I had not made up 
that kitten” (266). Although this insight certainly does not disprove the gen-
eral possibility of chimpanzees’ empathy with a kitten, Rosemary interprets 
this situation as an awareness of difference that leads to her self-recognition: 
“I realized that I did know who I was” (266). Focusing on the broad range 
of similarities between humans and chimpanzees, as well as their space of 
interrelations and interactions, the novel also investigates the pitfalls of a 
chimp-human experiment that entails not only empathy, community, and 
mutuality, but also jealousy, misunderstanding, and violence. 
In conclusion, the article has shown that the experience of uncanny other-
ness triggers an “identity shock” (Neumann 101) and facilitates human self-
conception. It can be also seen as an initiation of “‘the shock of recognition’ 
in the reader” whereby Fern functions as a “mirror image” (Lopičić and 
Petković 123). At the very end of this coming-of-age novel, Rosemary is 
much more cautious about her interpretation of Fern’s emotions and ability 
to recognize her during visits. The position of the chimpanzee as liminal 
species is again focused in the story’s closure, which depicts an emotional 
image of simultaneous interspecies understanding without dissolution of 
a structural separation, captured as a transparent but dividing glass panel. 
Rosemary’s self-recognition, which seems to have a positive effect on her 
personal development and to help her in overcoming her trauma, coincides 
with an awareness of guilt and betrayal. Rosemary blamed Fern for frighte-
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ning her, leaving Fern, who lacks a shared language, defenseless and unable 
to disprove the charge. While a human child might have been punished for 
a similarly gruesome act, the chimp loses the almost person-like status of a 
family member, is turned into an object and removed to a laboratory. As a 
punishment this would have been disproportionate. The comparison encap-
sulates the whole dimension of the current animal/human-divide and sheds 
light on the uncertain social status and inferior legal status even of primates.
With the mirroring motifs of the imprisonment of Fern and the brother, 
the novel also invites the reader to consider what it means for an animal to 
be detained. It brings to mind the potential consequences of lacking legal 
status, rights and one’s own voice to defend oneself, whether that may be 
because of one being a chimpanzee or otherwise. In doing so, Fowler’s novel 
offers a fresh and critical reflection on notions of human superiority that 
only seem to justify a categorical separation of humans and animals. Those 
who feel strong inter-species empathy will find this highly oppressive. So, 
the novel features not only animal’s interests but also exposes the social and 
emotional loss when humans are separated from companion species. Overall, 
Fowler’s text invites the reader to reflect on the epistemologies and ethics of 
interspecies relations as parts of an eco-zoopoetics. Setting the interspecies 
relationship as a family drama implies a highly emotional approach that asks 
the reader to experience empathy with the non-human animal.
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